This work leverages on the framework of Karakostas et al. (SCN’20) by extending it to the realm of reputation and trust. At the best of our knowledge, it is the first to introduce reputation and trust to proof of stake systems. Namely, we show that their delegation framework can be repurposed to construct a trust layer over a proof of stake consensus protocol in addition to its original stake delegation application. Furthermore, we show that such extension yields a concrete reputation system satisfying the positive results of (1) Asharov et al. (Asiacrypt’13), therefore allowing the secure execution of multiparty protocols such as GMW (STOC’ 87) and Damgard and Ishai (Crypto’05), and (2) Kleinrock et al. (Indocrypt’20), therefore allowing the construction of Reputation-fair Lottery and therefore Proof of Reputation. More concretely, our devised layer is used to construct a concrete reputation system based on arbitrary stake distribution. In this layer groups of users can freely “assign their respective trust” to members of a set of trustees, i.e., participants that offered themselves as receivers of such assignment. Furthermore, our work offers the advantage of providing a clear stake based criteria, verifiable in the ledger, and, therefore, naturally resistant to sybil attack, that the set of trustees indeed yields an honest majority.
This setting provides a better situation than a simple assumption of honest majority, since it involves stake in a decentralized ledger, and the public verifiability of the reputation score via verification of the stake distribution.